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ABSTRACT 
Taxpayers know their income but the IRS does not. The IRS can 
audit taxpayers to discover their true income, but auditing is costly. 
We characterize optimal policies for the IRS when it is free to choose 
tax levies, audit probabilities and penalties. The main results are 
that optimal policies involve taxes which are monotonically increasing 
in reported incomes and audit probabilities are monotonically 
decreasing in reported income. In general optimal schemes involve 
stochastic auditing of reports and rebates for telling the truth. A 
theory of optimal plundering is described. 
A THEORY OF AUDITING AND PLUNDER 
Kim C. Border and Joel Sobel 
The problem of inducing voluntary compliance with income-tax 
laws is a major public policy issue that has recently attracted the 
attention of the economics profession (see Reinganum and Wilde [1984a] 
and their references) . This paper derives properties of audit 
policies when the taxing authority has the freedom to choose the tax 
schedule, the schedule of penalties, and the probability with which 
any return is audited. The results are then applied to discuss a 
rudimentary theory of plunder. We adopt the following model. The 
taxing authority, which we call the IRS, knows the probability 
distribution of incomes for the population from which taxpayers are 
drawn. but does not know the income of any particular taxpayer. It 
may audit taxpayers in order to discover their income; auditing is 
perfect, but costly. Taxpayers, treating the policy of the IRS 
parametrically, act to maximize their expected net income. The IRS 
chooses its policy in order to maximize some function of its gross 
revenue and its auditing activity. 
It is not clear what the appropriate objective function for 
the IRS is. One possibility is to maximize expected revenue net of
audit costs. Another reasonable objective might be to minimize audit 
costs subject to a net revenue constraint. A third possibility is to
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maximize the sum of taxpayers' utility subject to a net revenue 
constraint. For the case of risk-neutral taxpayers, the sum of 
utilities is just total expected income minus gross revenue. For each 
of these objective functions, if auditing is costly, then an optimal 
auditing scheme will have the property that it is not possible to 
raise the same gross revenue with less auditing. If the objective 
function is increasing in gross revenue, then an optimal scheme will 
in addition have the property that revenue cannot be increased with 
the same amount of auditing. We call such schemes efficient auditing 
schemes and characterize them in our framework. Our major findings 
are: optimal auditing schemes need not exist unless taxes and 
penalties are bounded below; optimal auditing schemes typically 
involve stochastic auditing; and in an efficient direct scheme, in 
which the IRS induces truthful reporting, taxes are monotonically 
increasing and audit probabilities are monotonically decreasing in 
reported income, and rebates are given to taxpayers who are audited 
and found to be telling the truth, so that taxpayers prefer to be 
audited. 
Several assumptions limit our analysis. We assume that the 
distribution of income is fixed and unaffected by the IRS's policies. 
Thus, we abstract from the distortions that an income tax creates on 
the labor-leisure decisions made by wage earners (see Mirrlees [1971]) 
or on the decision to allocate effect between taxable and nontaxable 
sources of income (see Kramer and Snyder [1983]) . There are two 
reasons for this. One is to be able to attack the problem of 
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compliance per se, the other is that the solution of this problem is a 
necessary condition for solving the more general case in which 
policies affect the distribution of income. 
We also assume that the IRS can commit to an audit policy and 
that taxpayers respond optimally to this policy. Alternatively, we 
could have assumed that the IRS's policy must also be a best response 
to the taxpayer' s behavior. Reinganum and Wilde [19841 study this 
problem. 
Another major assumption of our analysis is that taxpayers 
seek to maximize their expected net income. Thus, taxpayers are risk 
neutral. When taxpayers are risk neutral, compliance is a more serious 
problem than when taxpayers are risk averse; our results provide lower 
bounds on the revenue that the IRS could raise with risk-averse 
taxpayers. 
We also assume that taxpayers cannot pay more than their 
income. This restriction limits the types of messages that taxpayers 
can send to the IRS since they must be able to pay the tax associated 
with any message. On the other hand, this assumption implies that the 
IRS has no greater threat than taking away the taxpayer' s income. 
Without this assumption, the IRS could extract all of the income of 
the taxpayers at an arbitrarily small cost by auditing rarely and 
levying enormous fines for misreported income. 
The last restrictive assumption that we discuss relates to the 
auditing technology. We assume that there is a fixed cost per audit 
and that an audit discovers true income without error. Baron and 
Besanko [1984], Laffont and Tirole [1985], and others present models 
in which auditing is possible, but cannot be done perfectly. 
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Finally, we assume that there is a finite set of income levels 
and that the cost of auditing a taxpayer is the same for all 
taxpayers. Allowing a continuum of income levels would not change our 
results, provided the support of the distribution is bounded. 
Our analysis generalizes the work of Reinganum and Wilde 
(1985) who restrict attention to lump sum taxes and audit cutoff 
rules, that is, rules with only two different audit probabilities. In 
their framework the optimal choices for the audit probabilities are 0 
and 1. Call an auditing policy deterministic if all the audit 
probabilities are either O or 1. We provide an example to show that
these sorts of Policies are not optimal in the class of more general 
audit rules and tax schedules. Townsend [1979] makes the paint that 
stochastic auditing dominates deterministic auditing in a somewhat 
different model. We also extend the analysis of Matthews [1984] who 
obtains partial results in a framework that is identical to ours. 1
MODEL 
We assume that there is a finite set {x1 • • • •  , xn
} of income
levels with hi > O taxpayers of income level xi. We label the incomes
so that 0 i x1 < • • •  < xn. The IRS chooses a set M of messages
(reports) that are available to a taxpayer. The IRS also chooses a tax 
function t : M � lR so that a taxpayer who reports message m sends a
payment t(m) to the IRS. Since we assume that taxpayers are incapable 
of paying more than their income, we limit the choice of message 
spaces and tax functions by assuming that for each i, there is a 
message mi satisfying t(mi) �
xi. After receiving the report m, the
IRS audits it with probability p(m) . If the IRS audits a taxpayer, 
that taxpayer's income is revealed and the IRS returns t(m) and 
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instead collects a payment of f(x,m) , where x is the taxpayer's income 
and m is his report. We assume that f(x,m) � x for all x and m.
* Given M, t, p, and f, let mi maximize
[1 - p(m) ][xi - t(m) ] + p(m) [xi - f(xi,m) ]
over {m e M : t(m) �xi} .
* 
I.e., mi is a report that maximizes the net
expected income of a taxpayer of income level xi, The IRS's objective 
function is assumed to depend only on gross revenue and auditing 
activity and can thus be written in the form 
f * * * * * "' F < :[;-
1 
{[1 - p(mi) ]t(mi) + p(mi) f(xi,mi) } hi,p(ili) ,• • •  ,p(mn) ) .
* 
We assume that F is decreasing in each p(m
i) .  
Consider the message space M* = {1, . . •  ,n} , the tax function t* 
* • * * defined by ti= t(mi) , the audit function p
* defined by pi= p(mi) and
* * 
penalty function f* defined by f .. = f(x1,m.) . For this choice of M,1J J 




* * * • 
[1 - pj][xi - tj] + pj[xi - fij]
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Thus without loss of generality we may assume that the IRS uses 
!x1 • • . .  ,xn} as its message space and that any scheme (t,f,p) it 
chooses satisfies the incentive constraints 
(1 - pi) (xi - ti) + pi(xi - fii) L (1 - pj) (xi - tj) + pj(xi - fij)
for all i,j satisfying tj �xi.
This argument is a slight modification of the standard proof 
of the Revelation Principle, which asserts that the IRS can restrict 
attention to direct mechanisms in which taxpayers have incentives to 
tell the truth. The modification is necessary because, in contrast to 
the typical mechanism-design problem, the IRS's mechanism must satisfy 
the constraint that taxpayers cannot pay more than their income. The 
Revelation Principle need not apply to situations in which the set of 
reports available to an agent depends on the agent's type.2
The incentive constraints are weakest when fij = xi for i # j.
Thus we set f
ij 
= xi for i # j and write fi for fii' Since we assume
that we can only consider schemes with ti� xi and fi �xi' we can
write the IRS's problem as 
n 
max F(� [(1 - pi) ti + pifi]hi,p1 • •  · • ,pn)
ti,pi,fi -1 
subject to 
0 � pi � 1
ti � xi
i 1, .. .. � n 
i 1, . • .  , n 
f i S. xi i = 1, . • .  ,n 
(1 - pi)
(xi - ti) + pi(xi - fi) L (1 - pj) (xi - tj) i,j = 1, • • •  ,n.
If the IRS maximizes net revenue, the objective function is 
n 
F = [_ zihiJ.=1 
n 
b1 cipihi
where zi = 
(1 - pi) ti + pif i and ci is the cost of auditing a report
of xi. If the IRS minimizes auditing costs subject to a revenue
requirement, the objective function can be written 
F = 
-b1 Ci pi hi if b1 zi hi - b1 ci pi hi L R 
t n n n 
n n n 
-'\ cipih - M if 'I zihi - 'I cipihi < R£=1 £=1 �1 
where R is the revenue requirement and M is chosen large enough so 
that the revenue requirement will be met if it is feasible to do so. 
Finally, if the IRS maximizes the sum of taxpayers' utilities, its 
objective function is 
F = r , i�l xi hi - bi zihi n n �xihi - b1zihi - M n n if [ zihi - [ cipihi 2 R J.=l J.=1 n n if [ zihi - [ cipihi < R J.=1 J.=1 
7 
Note that these latter objective functions are not increasing in gross 
revenue. 
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We denote the incentive constraints collectively by the symbol 
IC; IC(i,j) denotes the constraint that an individual with income xi
does as well to report xi as to report xj. The reason that the above
problem requires IC(i,j) to hold for all i and j rather than for just 
those for which xi 2 tj is notational. If xi < tj' then the 
constraint holds anyway. 
Note that the constraint set is not compact as ti and fi are
not bounded below. This may not seem crucial since the objective
function is increasing in ti and fi' but it does matter. The
intuition is this. Any solution to the above problem must force 
taxpayers to want to tell the truth. There are two ways to do this. 
One is to punish them for lying (fij = xi' i # j) , the other is to
reward them for telling the truth (fi < 0) . It may be that a large
reward for telling the truth can be offset by a tiny audit probability
and thus economize on audit costs. 
EXAMPLE 
The example given in the table below demonstrates the above 
intuition. The example uses three income levels and presents a family 
of schemes indexed by e > O.  
hl = 2 x1 = 1 Pi = 1 -
h2 = 1 Xz = 2 Pz = e 
h3 = 1 x3 = 3 p3 = 0 
(1 - s) tl = 1 2 
t2 = 2
t3 = 2 + E 
fl = 1 
f = 2 - !.....::.....§_ 2 2£ 
f3 = 3 
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Simple calculations show that the incentive constraints are 
satisfied and that the expected net revenue is equal to 4 1/4 - s/2.
Note that f2 � as s � O. In fact, tedious computation shows that
the supremum of expected net revenue is indeed 4 1/4 and is not 
achieved by any scheme. 
The observation that solutions do not exist relates to two 
familiar problems in the principal-agent literature. If perfect, ex 
post observations are feasible, then it is typically true than 
enforcement costs can be made arbitrarily small by forcing agents to 
pay large penalties with arbitrarily small probabilities if the agents 
fail to do what the principal prefers. This result is often 
associated with Becker [1968] and Stigler' s [1970] work on the 
economics of crime prevention.3 In general, Mirrlees [1975] shows
that even when observations are not perfect, it may be possible to 
approximate (but not attain) full-information optima with incentive 
schemes that require some agents to pay large penalties with small 
probabilities. We restrict attention to fines and taxes that do not 
exceed income. Consequently, approximating full-information optima 
with large fines is not feasible in our model. However, the benefits 
of paying arbitrarily large rewards with infinitesimal probability in 
order to weaken incentive constraints is not surprising in light of 
the earlier results. 
Thus, in order to guarantee the existence of optimal schemes, 
an additional ad hoc constraint is necessary. Since there is always 
the danger that an arbitrarily large reward for telling the truth 
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might have to be paid, a natural constraint is to prohibit any bonuses 
for telling the truth. This leads to the following problem. 
subject to 
n 
max F( � [(1 - pi) ti + pifi]hi, p1, • • •  , pn)ti, pi, fi b1 
0 i Pi i 1
o i ti i xi
0 i f i i xi
i = 1, .
•
. ,n 
i = 1, ... , n  
i = 1, • . .  , n  
(1 - pi)
(xi - ti) + pi
(xi - fi) £ (1 - pj) (xi - tj) i, j 1,, • • •  ,,n 
Note that the incentive constraint IC(i, i) reduces to fi i xi unless
pi = 0, in which case fi is irrelevant. This constraint set is
compact and since the objective function is continuous in all the 
variables an optimum does exist. 
CHARACTERIZATION OF OPTIMAL AUDITING SCHEMES 
This section investigates properties of the optimum. Set 
qi= 1 
- pi' zi = 
q
iti + 
(1 - qi) fi' and ui = xi - zi. Then qi is the
probability that taxpayer i is not audited; zi is the expected payment
of a taxpayer of income i; and ui is the expected utility of taxpayer
i. If qi = 1, then zi = ti and f i is irrelevant. If qi < 1, then 
fi
zi - qiti 
1 - qi
When qi < 1, f1 2 O is equivalent to zi - qiti 2 O.  
zi = ti. Thus an equivalent maximization problem is 
subject to 
"' n 
max F( � zihi, q1, • • •  , qn)qi, zi,ti /;;1 
0 i qi i q i = 1, • • •  , n  
0 i ti i xi i = 1, • . .  , n  
qi ti i zi i = 1, • • •  , n  








When qi= l, the incentive constraint IC
(i,i) implies ti 2 zi and the
constraint pi t1 i zi implies then that ti = zi' so all the constraints
are included. This objective function is increasing in each qi.
Call a scheme (z,t,q) feasible if it satisfies the constraints 
(2)-(4) and also satisfies the two conventions that 
if qi = 0, then ti = x1
( S. 1) 
and 
if qi 1, then fi ti.
( S. 2) 
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Call a scheme (z, t, q) audit efficient if it is feasible and there is 
n n 
no other feasible scheme (z' , t' , q' )  satisfying [: zihi = f" zihi and
i= l  £;;1 
qi 2 qi for all i with strict inequality for at least one i. A scheme
(z,t, q) is called revenue efficient if it is feasible and there is no 
other feasible scheme (z' , t' , q' ) with qi l qi for all i and zi l zi
for all i with at least one strict inequality. Any optimal scheme 
clearly satisfies the last part of the definition of audit efficiency 
(6) and is equivalent to a scheme satisfying (S.1) and (S. 2) . If the
objective function is strictly increasing in gross revenue, then any 
optimal scheme will be both audit efficient and revenue efficient. 
Conditions (5.1) and (S. 2) have been appended to avoid awkward 
circumlocutions in the statement of the theorem below. 
Another useful definition is the following. We say that 
report j attracts i, denoted i � j if i I j and IC(i, j) binds:
ui = qj
(xi - tj) .
Let A(i) = {j : i � j} and A- l(j) = {i : j s A(i) } .
The following theorem lists several properties of efficient 
(and hence optimal) schemes. The proof may be found in the appendix. 
THEOREM: If (z, t,q) is either audit efficient or revenue efficient, 
then 
1. If i > j, then
a. zi 2 zj, with equality if and only if qi qj 1. 
b. ui 2 uj' with equality if and only if ui
2. If i > j, then
a. qi 2 qj' with equality if and only if qi
b. ti 2 tj' with equality if and only if qj
3. For each i, ti 2 zi L fi.
4. -1 a. If qj < 1, then A (j) F d. 
b. If O <qi< 1, then i > A(i) .
c. If i > j, then A(i) 2 A(j)
d. q = 1 n 
e. n - 1 e A(n) .
f. If I = max {j : qj < 1} , then i e A(i + 1). 
0. 
o or q j
1. 
1. 
If (z, t, q) is revenue efficient then 
5. a. If i > 1, then A(i) F d. 
b. If i = min {j : qj > O}, then ui O if and only if i i i. 
Efficient schemes have a variety of not very surprising 
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properties. Part 1 states that higher income levels expect to pay more 
to the IRS and attain higher levels of utility than lower income 
levels. A simple consequence of Parts la and 2a is that if the cost 
of auditing all reports is the same, then first-order stochastically 
dominating shifts in income increase the revenue of the IRS. Part 2 
states that the auditing probabilities and taxes are monotonic in 
income. That fact that taxes should increase with reported income in 
a revenue-maximizing solution is intuitively clear. That the 
probability of an audit falls as income rises is a necessary measure 
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to prevent high-income taxpayers from reporting low incomes. 
Part 3 of the theorem states that honest taxpayers would 
rather be audited than not be audited. While this does not meet with 
our intuition about the real world, the reason for the result in our 
model is straightforward. When qi is fixed, the IRS has two
instruments to raise a given amount of revenue, zi' from a taxpayer
with income i: the tax, ti and the penalty, fi. Increasing ti while
reducing fi in a way that holds zi constant is beneficial to the IRS
because it weakens the incentive constraints IC(k, i) .  Therefore, the 
IRS can always improve on a tax scheme in which fi > ti for some i by
increasing ti and reducing fi. There are several reasons, not 
captured by our model, that would cause taxpayers to prefer not to be 
audited. First, auditing might impose a cost to the taxpayer in 
addition to any monetary payments required by the IRS. For example, 
the audit might involve gathering and/or manufacturing records and 
taking time to provide the IRS with information. In this case, 
taxpayers might prefer not to be audited even if the expected payment 
to the IRS given an audit is less than the expected payment to the IRS
when there is no audit. Second, even in our model, taxpayers who do 
not report their income honestly prefer not to be audited. This fact 
is not important in our model since honesty is preferred by all 
taxpayers. However, situations in which it is in the best interest of 
some taxpayers to misrepresent their income arise and can be 
incorporated into our model. Specifically, if some taxpayers always 
tell the truth regardless of the incentive scheme, but the IRS cannot 
directly observe honesty, then dishonesty, in spite of grave 
consequences if discovered, could be optimal for some taxpayers.4
Alternatively, audits could be imperfect and taxpayers could have 
different information regarding the probability that the IRS will 
discover a lie. 
lS 
Parts 4 and S of the theorem list technical results regarding 
which constraints bind in efficient schemes. Part Sa states that 
every taxpayer except those with the lowest income is indifferent 
between reporting true income and some other income. If this were not 
true, then the IRS could obtain more revenue from the taxpayer. It 
need not hold for the lowest income class only because these taxpayers 
obtain no surplus (Part Sb). Part 4a states that there is no reason 
to audit reports that are attractive only to taxpayers who report 
their true income; the IRS audits to encourage compliance. Part 4b 
implies that the only incentive constraints that need be included in 
the optimization problem are the downward constraints. that is, 
IC(i,j) for i > j. s Part 4c states that the set of reports that
attract an income class increases with income. Part 4d states that 
the IRS need not audit those taxpayers with the highest reported 
income. 
Part S states that if the IRS wants to maximize revenue,
ceterus paribus, the taxpayers with the lowest income always receive 
no surplus as does any other taxpayer who cannot receive positive 
surplus by underreporting income. 
It may be worthwhile to note two directions in which the 
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theorem does not extend. First, if the IRS has a utilitarian 
objective function, then Part S of the theorem does not hold. The 
reason to extract all of the income of low-income taxpayers is to 
increase revenue. If the utility of these taxpayers entered 
positively in the objective function of the IRS, then there is no 
reason in general for them to be persecuted. Second, the monotonicity 
results need not hold if the IRS seeks to redistribute income. An 
extreme case convinces one that this must be so. Consider a situation 
in which auditing is costless and that the IRS cares only about 
revenue and the utility of intermediate inc0111e levels. In this 
situation, it is plain that the IRS will leave all but the 
intermediate income levels with no income, but not tax the 
intermediate groups at all. 
While the theorem are for the most part intuitively appealing 
and quite consistent with results in related types of mechanism-design 
problems, we should remark that the results do not go as far as 
results in similar models and our proofs, while elementary, are 
delicate. For a concrete comparison, consider the auction-design 
problem (see Haskin-Riley [1984a,b] and Myerson [1981]) with risk­
neutral buyers, which our model resembles. In the auction-design 
problem, the seller faces a fixed number of buyers. The seller knows 
the distribution from which the values of the buyers are drawn, but 
not their exact value. The seller's objective is to find a mechanism, 
which consists of a probability that a given bid will win the item as 
well as a purchase price, that maximizes his expected profit. The 
standard approach in this type of problem is to solve a modified 
optimization problem in which local downward incentive constraints, 
those constraints of the form IC(i,i - 1) , bind, but all other 
incentive constraints do not bind. It is often possible to obtain a 
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solution to the modified problem. This solution is a solution to the 
original problem if two conditions hold. First, the local downward 
incentive constraints must bind in the solution to the original 
problem. This condition guarantees that the modified problem has 
fewer constraints than the original problem. Second, the solution to 
the modified problem must satisfy the additional incentive constraints 
of the original problem. The second condition need not be true in 
general. However, in the auction-design problem it is possible to 
find conditions on the underlying variables of the model under which, 
if the local downward incentive constraints bind, then all constraints 
are satisfied. This approach does not help us analyze our problem 
because there is no guarantee that the local downward incentive 
constraints bind. It is straightforward, but tedious, to construct 
examples in which local incentive constraints do not bind at the 
optimum. While the fact that only the downward incentive constraints 
may bind at the optimum allows us to simplify our problem along the 
lines of Moore [1984], we are unable to explicitly characterize 
optima. 
We represent some of the qualitative feature of efficient 
schemes in Figure 1. There is a (possibly empty) group of taxpayers 
who report low incomes and are al ways audited. Taxpayers who make 
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these reports pay all of their income in taxes. There is a nonempty 
group of high reports that are never audited. The IRS audits 
intermediate reports with a probability strictly between zero and one. 
While we do not have a simple, general condition that guarantees that 
the revenue-maximizing scheme requires selecting 0 < qi < 1 for some
i, these schemes are necessary in general. 6 A routine verification,
aided by the results in the theorem, shows that the net revenue 
maximizing scheme for the example is the element in the family that we 
described in which e = 1/S. Thus, for the example, q1 = 2
/S and
q2 = 4
/S in the optimal scheme.
As a final remark about revenue-maximizing schemes we note 
that it can be shown that the nonnegativity constraint on the 
penalties binds if and only if there is no optimum in which qi
1 for all 1. 
LUMP SUM TAXES AND DETERMINISTIC AUDITING 
In this section, we present results that relate lump-sum 
O or 
taxation to deterministic auditing. We do this because tax policies 
in this restrictive class may be of interest in their own right and 
also to further relate our work to Reinganum and Wilde [1985]. 
Formally, we call taxes lump sum if the tax function satisfies 
t(x) = min [x,T] for some T > O. We present three propositions about
lump-sum taxation. In this section we assume the IRS seeks to 
maximize expected net revenue. 
Proposition 1: If the distribution of incomes has a continuous 
distribution with an interval support and if the optimal taxation 
scheme involves lump-sum taxation, then auditing is deterministic. 
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Proof: Let t(x) = min [x, T]. By Part 2b of the theorem all taxpayers 
with incomes greater than or equal to T are never audited. Therefore, 
uT = O and hence qx = O for all x i T. D 
Proposition 1 depends on the assumption that there are a 
continuum of income levels. The example that we presented earlier 
makes this point. The fact that the result depends on the nature of 
the distribution of income levels indicates that lump-sum tax policies 
are less likely to be optimal as the number of income levels 
increases. 
Proposition 2: If the revenue-maximizing tax scheme is deterministic, 
then taxes are lump sum. 
Proof: If the optimal tax scheme is deterministic, then 
1 = min {j : qj > 0} = min 
{j : qj = 1
}
and, by Part 5 of the Theorem, ui = 0 if and only if i � 1. It
follows from Part 2 of the theorem that t(x) = min[x,x1
1.
The final result of this section gives restrictions on 
penalties under which deterministic auditing is optimal. 
D 
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Proposition 3: If the IRS is restricted to schemes in which all 
audited taxpayers must pay their entire income to the IRS, that is, if 
fi = xi for all i, then there exists an optimal auditing scheme that
is deterministic. 
When the condition of Proposition 3 is met our problem reduces 
to a standard mechanism-design problem. In particular, local downward 
incentive constraints bind; we can use this fact, and familiar 
arguments (see, for example Myerson [1981] and Haskin and Riley 
[1984a]) to show that we can take the auditing scheme to be 
deterministic. 
A THEORY OF PLUNDER 
The model of income taxation has other interpretations. For 
instance, the "IRS" might be a conglanerate manager and the 
"taxpayers" might be his subsidiary managers. The manager does not 
know the profits of each subsidiary, but can send auditors to verify 
the managers' reports. Such a manager would be interested in 
maximizing the net revenue to the parent company. 
In both of the IRS and conglanerate interpretations, there is 
arguably a legitimate claim on the part of the principal to the income 
of the agents. This need not be the case. Kurosawa [1954] describes 
the problem faced by a roving band of brigands which assails a peasant 
village and demands tribute. Upon receiving the tribute, the brigands 
may either move on or plunder the village. The latter course is more 
costly, particularly if the village harbors masterless samurai. The 
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brigands' problem is to choose two schedules; p(t) , the probability of 
plundering the village if they receive an amount of tribute t, and 
b(x,t) the amount of booty they carry off if they plunder and find 
wealth x and were offered tribute t; so as to maximize their expected 
revenue net of plundering costs, given that the peasants respond 
optimally. The peasants are risk-neutral so that if the brigands can 
make commitments, then this problem is formally very close to the 
model of tax compliance analyzed earlier. That is, the peasants 
choose the amount of tribute to offer, t•(x) so as to maximize 
(1 - p(t) ) (x - t) + p(t) (x - b(x,t) ) .  The difference is that the IRS 
could choose a scheme in which two different income reports paid the 
same tax, but were audited with different probabilities. The 
brigands' schedule is a function only of the offered tribute. 
However, Part 2b of the theorem states that the IRS would never want 
A A A 
to do this. Letting t, .P• f denote the IRS's expected net revenue










The fact that t"-1 is not well defined is not essential, because if
A A A A A 
t(x) = t(y) and x F y then p(x) = p(y) = 0 and f(x,x) is irrelevant. 
The peasants' optimal response to these schedules is to offer tcxl
when the village wealth is x. Part 3 of our theorem says that 
A A 
b(x,t(x) ) � t(x) for optimally chosen policies. That is, after
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plundering, the brigands never take more than they were offered! This 
underscores the need for the brigands to be able to make commitments.
If they are unable to make commitments, the only believable schedule 
is b(x,t) = x, which puts them in the suboptimal world of Proposition 
3. That is, there would be some level of tribute which would buy them
off and any lesser amount would cause them to plunder. Thus it is in 
the brigands' interest to design an institution that makes the 
schedules believable. One way the schedules might be believable is if 
it is common knowledge that there is a strong and vindictive god that 
the brigands could swear by.
7 
Another possibility for the brigands is 
to somehow create an institution like the state, which would have 
codified laws which presumably have more force than just the word of a 
roving band of brigands. 
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APPENDIX: PROOFS 
The proof of the theorem is divided into several lemmas. The 
following table indicates which lemmas are used directly in the proof 
of any part of the theorem. There are some statements in the theorem 
which do not follow immediately from any lemma, but the details are 
easily filled in. 
Part of Theorem Lemmas that Apply 
1 7 






4e 18c, 14 
4f 18c 
5 20, 6 '  7b 
Throughout this section the statements of all results are 
understood to be preceded by the phrase, "If (z, t, q) is either audit 
efficient or revenue efficient, then • • " Lemmas that apply only
to revenue efficient schemes will carry a separate label. Both kinds
of efficiency imply that it is impossible to increase some qj' holding
everything else fixed. 
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Lemma 1: -1 If qj < 1, then there exists i £ A (j) such that xi 2 tj.
Proof: If the lemma fails to hold, then there exists j with qj < 1
such that for all i I j,
ui > qj(xi - tj) or tj > xi.
Moreover, if the first inequality in (1) fails to hold, then the 
second inequality implies that qj = uj = o . Consequently, for all 
i I j,
ui > qj(xi - tj) or qj = 0 and tj > xi.
(1) 
( 2) 
It follows from (2) that we can increase qj and reduce tj in such a
way that qjtj does not change and IC(i, j) continues to hold for i I j. 
Since the constraint IC(j, j) reduces to xj 2 fj when qj < 1, 
increasing q. in this way is feasible. This result contradictsJ 
efficiency and therefore establishes the lemma. 
Lemma 2: For each j, at least one of the constraints xj 2 tj'
zj 2 qjtj holds with equality.
D 
Proof: If qj = 1, then zj = tj. If qj = 0, then tj = xj by
convention. If 0 < qj < 1, then Lemma 1 implies that there exists some
i a A-1(j).  Unless xj = t. or zj = q.t., we could increase t . •J J J J 
However, increasing tj weakens IC(i, j). Consequently we could make
-1 A (j) empty, contradicting Lemma 1, so either xj = t. or zj = q.t . •
Lemma 3: For each j, tj 2 zj 2 fj.
J J J a 
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Proof: If tj = xj' then the lemma follows since xj l zj and zj is a
convex combination of t. and f . • Otherwise, by Lemma 2, zj = qjt. and J J J 





Lemma 4: If qi l qj and qj > 0, then ti l tj.
Proof: Suppose that the result fails and ti < tj. Since qj > O, then
for any x L ti'
qi(x - ti) > qj(x - tj) . ( 1) 
If qj = 1, then (1) and IC(j,i) imply tj > zj' which contradicts the 
definition of zj. If qj < 1, then by Lemma 1 there exists
xk L tj > ti such that IC(k,j) binds. But then (1) implies that
IC(k,i) is violated. This contradiction establishes the lemma. 
Lemma 5: If qj = 1, tj > 0, i � j and zi = qiti' then qi = 1 and 
ti tj.
Proof: Since i � j and qj = 1, 
xi - zi = xi tj (1) 
so 
tj = zi = qiti. ( 2) 
Since tj > 0, it follows from ( 2) that qi > 0. Then ( 2) and Lemma 4
imply qi= 1 and tj = ti . 0 
Lemma 6 :  For every i, there is some j such that IC(i,j) binds. 
Proof: If the scheme is revenue efficient the result is immediate. 
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Assume that the scheme is audit efficient. If qi = 1, then IC(i,i)
binds. The argument for the case qi < 1 is by contradiction. Suppose
that IC(i,j) binds for no j. Then zi can be increased without
violating any incentive constraints. The revenue increase generated 
by increasing zi can be offset by lowering some other zk's in such a
way that qi can be increased, which contradicts efficiency. If
zk > qktk for some k F i, then that zk can be decreased without
violating any constraints and offset the revenue increase from 
increasing zi. Thus without loss of generality assume that zk = qktk
for all k F i. If k s A-1Ci) implies that xk = 0, then qi can be 
increased without violating IC(k,i) . Thus without loss of generality 
-1 we may assume that for some k s A (i) , xk > O. 
-1 First consider the case qi= 0 and let k s A (i) . Then
xk - zk = qi(xk - ti) = O.
Since zk = qktk' (1) implies that qk = 1 and tk = xk. In order to
decrease zk we must also decrease tk. The obstacles to lowering tk
are the constraints IC(j,k) .  Let j � k. Then
xj - zj = xj - tk.
( 1) 
( 2) 
Since zj = qjtj ' Lemma 5 implies that qj = l, tj 
if IC(j',j) binds then IC(j', k) binds.
tj' and furthermore
Thus if we increase qi to � > 0, reduce zk and tk by
�(xk - ti) for all 
k e A-1(i) for which xk F 0, and then reduce
-1 zj ( = tj) by �(xj - ti) for all j e A (k) no constraints will be
violated. By proper choice of � any small increase in zi can be 
offset so as to hold gross revenue constant and qi may be increased,
contradicting efficiency. 
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Next consider the case O < qi < 1. First increase zi and then
increase qi and ti so that each IC(
k,i) continues to hold. 
a(xk - ti) -1 (Increasing qi by e and ti by + for
k = max A (i) works. ) 
8 
qi
Now let z* = max {zj
} and let z satisfy zm = z*. We will show how tojFi 
m 
decrease zm without violating any constraints. To do this we must
decrease tm and again the obstacles are the IC(j,m) constraints.
Suppose 
xj - zj = qm(xj - tm) .
By hypothesis, j F i, so by the choice of m, zm 2 zj.
zm = qmtm' (3) can be rewritten as
(1 - qm) xj = zj - zm i O.
There are two ways that (4) might hold: either xj 






If zm = 0, then zk = 0 for all k F i. Since 0 < qi < 1, for
any k Fi satisfying xk = qi(xk - ti ) ' it follows th at xk =ti = 0, 
-1 which contradicts the existence of k e A (i) with xk > o. 
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If zm > 0, then qm = 1 and zj = zm. Since qm = 1 implies that
zm = tm' Lemma 5 implies that qj = 1 and zj = tj = tm. Also, if
IC(j',j) binds, then IC(j',m) binds, so so we may reduce zm and zj for 
j e A-1(m) without violating any constraints. This leads to a
contradiction of efficiency and establishes the lemma. 
Lemma 7: If i > j, then 
a. zi 2 zj.
b. ui 2 uj and if ui > 0, then ui > uj.
Proof: It follows from IC that 
(1 - qk) xi + qktk 2 zi
for all i and k. Thus, Lemma 6 implies that 
for all i. 
zi = min 
{(1 - qk) xi + qktk
} 
k 
Therefore, since xi > xj'
zi = min 
{(1 - qk) xi + qktk} 2 min {(1 - qk) xj 
+ qktk
} = zj.k k 
Similarly, 






where the last inequality follows since xi 2 ti. 
inequality is strict if and only if ui > O.
Plainly, the first 
D 
Lemma 8: If for some xi > O , ti = O; then for all j, tj = 0 and
qj = 1. 
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Proof: If ti = 0 it follows from Lemma 2 that zi = qiti = 0. Lemma 6
implies that for some k, IC(i,k) binds, i. e. , 
xi= qk(xi - tk) .
(1) 
Since xi > 0, (1) implies that qk = 1 and tk = O . Then for any j,
IC(j,k) becomes 
xj - zj 2 xj'
so that for all j, zj = O and hence tj = O. Then for any j and m,
IC(m,j) reduces to xm 2 qjxm' so efficiency implies that qj = 1 for
all j. 
Lemma 9: If i > j and ti � tj' then qi 2 qj.
Proof: Since xj 2 tj' we have 
xi > xj 2 tj 2 ti.
Therefore, 





where the equality follows from Lemma 2 and (1), the first inequality 
follows from Lemma 7a and the second inequality follows from 
feasibility. If ti > o, then (1) and (2) imply that qi 2 qj. If
ti= O , it follows from (1) and Lemma 8 that qi= qj = 1.
Lemma 10: If ti = tj' then qi = qj.
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0 
Proof: Without loss of generality we may assume that qi 2 qj. Then if
qj = 1, qi = qj = 1. If on the other hand qj < 1, then by Lemma 1 
there is some k e A-
l
(j) satisfying xk 2 tj. Combining then IC(k,j)
and IC(k,i) yields 
uk = qi
(xk - ti) =  qj(xk - tj) '
(1) 
which implies either qi = qj or 
xk = ti = tj. ( 2) 
If qi I qj' then (2) implies uk = 0, which in turn implies
xk = tk = zk. (3) 
Thus 
ti = tj = tk.
(4) 
However, since k I j, xj 2 tj and (2) imply
xj > xk = tj. (5) 
It follows that 
qjtj = zj 2 zk = tk = tj
(6) 
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where the first equality follows from (5) and Lemma 2, the inequality 
follows from (5) and Lemma 7a, and the next two equalities follow from 
(3) and (4). From (6) it follows that qj = l, contrary to assumption,
or that tj = o. Then (5) and Lemma 8 imply qj = qi = 1. In any
event, qi = qj.
Lemma 11: If i > j and qi= 0, then qj = O .  
Proof: If qi = 0, then by convention, xi= ti. Lemma 1 implies the
-1 existence of an xk l xi with k £ A (i) . Therefore,
O = qi(xk - xi) = uk l qj(xk - tj) ,
where the inequality follows from IC(k,j) .  However, 
xk > xi > xj l tj
since k f i and i > j. Combining (1) and (2) yields qj = o. 





Proof: We first show that qi l qj. If ti < tj' then Lemma 9 implies
qi l qj. If ti = tj' then Lemma 10 gives the result. If ti > tj'
suppose that qi 2 qj is false, i. e. , that qi< qj. Then the
contrapositive of Lemma 4 (exchanging the roles of i and j ) implies
qi =  0, so qj = 0 by Lemma 11. Thus qi l qj. 
If qj > 0, then Lemma 4 impl
ies ti 2 tj. If qj = O, then 
Lemma 1 implies tha t  there is some k £ A-l(j) with xk > t. and so- J 
0 = uk l qi(xk - ti) ( 1) 
32 
where the inequality follows from IC(k,i) . It follows from (1) that 
either xk = ti or qi= O .  If ti = xk' then xk l tj implies ti l tj.
If qi = 0, then ti = xi by convention, so i > j implies ti > tj.
Lemma 13: If O < qi= qj < 1, then i = j. 
D 
Proof: It follows from Lemma 4 that ti = tj. We now assume i > j and
argue to a contradiction. We have xi > xj l tj ti; therefore
zj l qjtj = qiti = zi (1) 
where the last equality follows from Lemma 2. Since i > j, Lemma 7a
and (1) imply that 
zi = zj"
Lemma 6 implies that for some k, 
xi - zi = qk(xi - tk) = qk(xi - xj + xj - tk)
� qk(xi - xj) + xj - zj
where the inequality follows from IC(j,k) . Since xi - xj > 0, (2) 
implies that (3) holds only if qk = 1 and therefore
tk = zi = zj
and thus 





where, in (5) , the first equality follows from (1) ,  the second equality 
33 
from (4) and the inequality from Lemma 12 since qk = 1 > qi. Thus (5)
implies ti = o, so by Lemma 8, qi = qj = 1, a contradiction. 
Lemma 14: If i F j, then ti = tj if and only if qi= qj = 1. 
D 
Proof: From Lemma 10, ti = tj implies qi = qj. Thus Lemma 13 implies
that if i # j and ti= tj' then either qi= qj = O or qi= qj = 1. 
However, if i # j and qi = qj = 0, then ti = xi # xj = tj. This
proves that if i F j and ti = tj' then qi = qj = 1.
Conversely if qi = qj = 1, then zi = ti and zj
IC(i,j) and IC(j,i) combine to imply that ti = tj.
Lemma 15: If O < qj < 1 and i � j, then i > j.
tj" 
Proof: Assume that i < j and argue to a contradiction. Then
xi - zi = qj(xi - tj) .
Since xi - zi 2 O and qj > 0, xi 2 tj. It follows that
xj > xi 2 tj > ti
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 14. Therefore 
zj = qjtj > qiti = zi






inequality follows from (2) and the fact that qj 2 qi which is a 
consequence of Lemma 12. Rearranging (1) and using z. = qjt. yieldsJ J 
O f (1 - qj) xi = zi - zj' (4) 
contradicting (3). 
Lemmas 1 and 15 combined have the following immediate 
consequence. 
Lemma 16: If qj < 1, then for some i > j, i � j.
Lemma 17: If I= max{j : qj < 1}, then
a. i < n.
b. For all i # j, if i, j > I, then i � j.
c. i + 1 � 1. 
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0 
Proof: Part a follows directly from Lemma 16. To prove the remainder 
of the lemma, recall that Lemma 14 implies that for all i,j >I
ti = tj (1) 
Part b follows directly from qi= qj = 1 and (1) . Finally, Lemma 16 
- -
guarantees that there exists an i > i such that i � i. Therefore, by
IC, we have 
xi - zi 2 q_(xi - ti) or i 
xi 2 (zi - qiti) 
/ (1 - q_) ,
i 
with equality for some i > i, However, the right hand side is
independent of i for i > i because of (1) and the definition of i.




Lemma 18: If i l j and i )j, where i is as defined in Lemma 17, then
zi > zj.
Proof: Lemma 6 implies 
zj = min 




Lemma 14 implies that if k > I, then ti = tn. Lemma 17c implies that
Thus for j i 1. 
tn = (1 - q_) x_ + q_t_.
i i+l i i 
z. = min {(1 - qk) xj + qktk
} . J -
kii 
Then if i > j and j i i, since xi > xj and qk < 1 for k i i,
zi = m�n {(1 - qk) xi + qktk} > mi� {(1 - qk) xj + qktk} = zj
kii 
Lemma 19: If i � k, and j � m, 0 < � < 1 and i > j, then k 2 m.
Proof: Together i � k and IC(i,m) imply that
qk(xi - tk) = ui L qm(xi - tm) .
Similarly, j � m and IC(j, k) imply that
qm(xj - tm
) 
= uj 2 qk(xj - tk) , 







xi(qk - qm) L qktk - qmtm L xj(qk - qm) .
Consequently, if i > j, then qk L qm. The lemma now follows from
Lemmas 12 and 13. 
Lemma 20: Suppose that (z,t,q) is revenue efficient. Let 




Proof: If j < !, then qj = O , so we can replace IC(!,j) by u1 2 o. If
j > !, then by Lemma 15, IC(!,j) can bind only if qj = qi = 1. In
that case, Lemma 14 implies that ti = tj and IC(!,j) holds
automatically. Finally, IC(!,!) reduces to f ! i x1, which is
independent of u1. Thus revenue efficiency is obtained by setting
u! = x1 - z! = o. The lemma now follows from Lemma 7b. D 
FOOTNOTES 
1. Matthews [1984] has some results for the case in which taxpayers
are risk averse and the IRS seeks to maximize a weighted sum of 
taxpayer's utilities subject to a revenue constraint.
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2. This point was made by Green and Laffont [1983] who restricted
attention to revelation mechanisms. It should be noted that our
restriction on the message space and tax function satisfies their
nested range condition.
3. Polinsky and Shavell [1979] show that these results depend on the
assumption of risk neutrality.
4. In the context of a model in which the IRS chooses only the audit
policy and is not able to make commitments, Graetz, Reinganum and
Wilde [1983] show that if some taxpayers are honest, then there is
a mixed strategy equilibrium which involves high income taxpayers
misreporting their income with some positive probability.
5 .  Part 4c implies that we can delete, without loss of generality, 
constraints of the form IC(j,i) for i > j from the optimization
problem provided that 0 < qj < 1. If q . = 0, then t. = x . • Thus, J J J 
for i > j, ti > tj = xj and IC(j,i) is automatically satisfied.
If qj = 1, then an efficient scheme involves qi= qj' ti= tj for 
all i > j whether or not we include IC(j,i) in the set of 
constraints. 
6 .  If the spacing between income levels i s  uniform, say 
xi+l - xi= 1, and the distribution of incomes is decreasing and
exponential, so that hi+l = ahi for O < i < n, then there always
exists a nontrivial interval of costs for which stochastic 
auditing dominates deterministic policies. 
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